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Money, Religion, and Tyranny:
God and the Demonic in
Luther's Antifragile Theology
Guillermo Hansen

Introduction
A new specter is haunting our lives— the specter of debt. A sense of
powerlessness is disrupting our economic, psychological, political, cul
tural, and spiritual “comfort zones.” It is as though scenes and realities
that once were associated with the Global South are now knocking at our
doors. Debt is no longer a problem ravaging faraway lands but is installed
in the living rooms of our mortgaged homes, it is carried in the pockets
of our trousers and purses, and it determines who can pursue higher
education and even who can enter the ministry. Some think that this is
a moral problem, the erosion of a Protestant ethic that once saw debt as
synonymous with sin and its replacement by the hedonistic code of “buy
now and pay later.”1 Others ruminate that debt is the result of policies
and programs of entitlements and (social) spending that are dragging our
country to an economic Gehenna. While there are some truths in both
views, both miss the mark. The debt crisis is a structural problem: the
“problem” that, paradoxically, has been the engine of the capitalist mode
of accumulation since its inception. Not only is money created day in and
day out on the basis of debt; not only do banks exist by lending what they
don’t have (i.e., cash) through the creation of what did not exist (i.e.,
debtors); but the very circulation of commodities, services, and labor is
structurally based on debt. What we are experiencing today is very sim
ple: The capitalist chicken has come home to roost after a long detour
through overseas coops.
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How is debt related to theology? Surprisingly, Luther offers us two
points of entry into this problem. One is his analysis of early capitalist
practices during the 16 lh century and the ravaging effect of debt across
the society of his day. The other is his identification of the reality of
money and its instruments not merely as ethical or practical problems,
but as confessional and religious ones: “The trust and faith of the heart
alone make both God and an idol,” Luther remarks in his Large Cate
chism, adding laconically that “mammon . . . is the most common idol
on earth.”2 In the first part of this paper, I shall explore Luther’s under
standing of the early practices of capitalism and to what extent his view
can be gauged against Walter Benjamin’s thesis that one can behold in
capitalism a religion. We shall see that Luther approached the matter of
money, capital, and debt as the arena of an apocalyptic struggle between
God and the Devil, a struggle marked by a misplaced and distorted “trust
and faith.” In the Reformer’s view, the economy of “gift,” encapsulated
in the symbol of Christ, is contrasted with the economy of “debt,” the
paragon of the demonic.
If one can behold in capitalism a (demonic) religion, how is this
manifested today? In the second part of this paper, I will approach the
“religious” traces of the contemporary hyper-financial capitalism that
emerged as a result of a transference of divine attributes to the market,
and how the virtual and speculative nature of financial capitalism on the
one hand, and consumerism on the other, reflect subjective valuations as
a form of (idolatrous) “faith.” If for Luther faith meant to “trust in God
alone and turn to him, expecting from him only good things; for it is
he who gives us body, life, food, drink, nourishment, health, protection,
peace, and all temporal and eternal blessings,”3 then for capitalism, the
seat of all hope is the miraculous quality of money. I shall concentrate
particularly on the “religious” promises of capitalism as a concealment
of the ontological gap that characterizes human existence by promising
a fulfillment of human personality— a centering of one’s whole self not
only upon immanent realities but on the active exploitation of the neigh
bor’s needs and wants.
But if capitalism survives thanks to the deep psychological and
emotional drives that make it either “God” or an idol, what should our
Christian stance be? Cynical, reformist, revolutionary? In the third part
of this paper, I shall return to Luther’s insights from a Pauline-apoca
lyptic perspective which outlines a threefold strategy for Christian living:32
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living from the end times as shaped by the event of Christ as gift (justifi
cation by faith); living between the times as engagement with neighbors
and creation (love/law); and living at the end of (an historical) time as
preparation for a revolutionary bifurcation in history. While the latter
remained underdeveloped and even shunned in Luther, the readiness
of the Christian that is a mark of the apocalyptic expectation did not.
From, between, and at the end of times thus mark the proper Christian
existence: an existence that is critical of current economic practices and
conceptions (cynical living) ,4 eagerly expectant of the new to come (rev
olutionary living), and yet engaged in a permanent deferral of the final
apocalyptic denouement in history for the sake of the most vulnerable in
creation (reformist living). Luther’s views on the three orders of creation,
the two kingdoms, and the twofold governance of God allow us to en
compass the three aspects listed above in a powerful anti-fragile5 recipe
in the midst of the fragile texture of history.

Luther and Capital
A common assumption among many Lutheran theologians is that
matters pertaining to political economy (e.g., money and market, labor
and capital) should be treated with flexibility and lenience, as problems
occurring in the realm of practical reason—what traditionally has been
adjudicated to the left hand of God or to the “secular” realm. Because
nothing that falls within this sphere can represent a danger to salvation or
to the Gospel, these phenomena thus acquire the connotation of “adiaphora,” things that have no relation whatsoever to faith or the practice of faith.
Yet for Luther, money, capital, debt, labor, and the economy were
theological issues of first order, for they refer to relational fields in which
and through which the struggle between the Devil and Christ was car
ried out.6 Not only was Luther a keen observer and analyst of the early
practices of what later will be known as capitalism, but he identifies prac
tices such as credit, debt, inflation, interest, usury, rent, and monopoly as
the expression of unbelief, a demonic reality, or even Satan’s kingdom.7
“Money,” Luther writes, “is the word of the Devil, through which he
creates all things the way God created through the true word.”8 For him,
economic as well as political issues were theological realities in the sense
that these describe not only fields in which the human engages with na
ture and other humans in productive and distributive spheres that sustain
the very fabric of creation, but also arenas where God’s very glory is
at stake. “Creatures are the hands, channels, and means through which
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God bestows all blessings,” Luther states in his Large Catechism.9 And in
his Confession of 1528 , he propounds a theology of three “holy orders”
(household/economy, secular government, church) through which we
are engaged in God’s holy work.10
In order to better appreciate the place that the economy in general and
capitalism in particular had in Luther’s own thought, I propose to follow an
oblique path that is provided by an heuristic prism contained in the famous
remark of Walter Benjamin: “One can behold in capitalism a religion, that
is to say, capitalism essentially serves to satisfy the same worries, anguish,
and disquiet formerly answered by so-called religion.”" As the German
text indicates (“Im Kapitalismus ist eine Religion zu erblicken”), Benja
min does not simply state that capitalism is a religion, but rather that in
capitalism we can discern one of the structuring principles of religion. Or
even more poignantly, capitalism is able to function as a religion because
it explicitly denies that it is a religion. The kernel of religion, according to
Benjamin, is Schuld—a dual sign that implies both guilt in the religious,
moral sense and debt in the economic sense.12 For Benjamin, capitalism
“makes [Schulcl] pervasive. Capitalism is probably the first instance of a
cult that creates [Schuld], not atonement.”13 This is a critical observation
because if the basic structure of religion is Schuld (i.e., debt compounded
by guilt), then capitalism is a sublime expression of the negative pole of this
structure (i.e., it is sustained by the perpetual generation of debt/guilt). Yet
the lack of any atonement converts it into an utterly demonic religion. “An
order, whose sole constitutive concepts are misery and guilt and in which
there is no way of liberation,” Benjamin writes in Fate and Character, “such
an order could not [really] be religious”— for it is the demonic appearance
of it.14A religion without atonement or liberation is what characterizes the
historical “enormity” of capitalism. In this instance, “religion is no longer
the reform of being, but rather its obliteration.”15
It is my aim to show that Luther’s approach to matters pertaining
to money, capital, and debt are passable of a benjaminian reading, and
that Benjamin’s fragmentary thoughts can aptly be expanded by Luther’s
insights. Did Luther regard capitalism as a religion? Certainly he never
referred to capitalism in these terms, since what today we term capital
ism (as a mode of relations, production, and accumulation) is a category
gained through hindsight. Luther himself—just like his contemporaries—
was not even remotely aware that he was facing the multiple prongs of a
new economic regime. But while Luther did not possess the overarching34
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category of “capitalism,” he did indeed address the new type of (eco
nomic) practices that later will be deemed the core of capitalist modes of
production and accumulation. Moreover, Luther possessed a concept of
religion that was able to locate the phenomena of early capitalist practices
not just as an anomaly in the smooth texture of the feudal world, but as
the structuring of subjectivities in open discord with Christian faith.
Capitalism as religion? Revisiting the first commandment

What we usually refer to as “religion” is either the result of a histori
cal-comparative summary of its “marks,” or the salient features of our own
practices and beliefs. Notions such as God, transcendence, worship and
ritual, sacred texts, and a set of moral codes appear as the indispensable
elements of this type of human behavior and thought which in its present
form can be traced back to the Axial Age.16But since the dawn of modernity
and the processes entailed by secularization, we can no longer confine the
scope of religion to the standard referential poles framed within metaphysi
cal strategies of thought presupposing the existence of supernatural beings
or gods. One should not fall into the naive assumption that the secular is
just secular (i.e., religionless), for modernity and late modernity signify a
displacement of what constitutes—in Tillich’s celebrated words— the “ul
timate concern.” Or as the Brazilian economist and theologian Jung Mo
Sung suggests, modernization entails the secularization of eschatological
hopes where space and time are conceived in their infinite potentials.17 In
sum, after the great transformation of modernity, religion does not disap
pear—it only camouflages itself under a new disguise.18
Cultural anthropological studies offer us a more latitudinarian ap
proach to the reality of religion, as in Clifford Geertz’ definition: “A
religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful,
pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [sic] by (3 )
formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4 ) clothing
these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and
motivations seem uniquely realistic.”19 Adopting the theory of complex
adaptive systems, another definition is offered by Mark C. Taylor: “Reli
gion is an emergent, complex, adaptive network of symbols, myths, and
rituals that, on the one hand, figure schemata of feelings, thinking, and
acting in ways that lend meaning and purpose and, on the other, disrupt,
dislocate, and disfigure every stabilizing structure.”20
Can these definitions offer a clue regarding capitalism as a religion?
In order to appreciate the reaches of Benjamin’s statement, let us turn to a
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minimalist definition of religion that we find in Luther himself. Religion is a
matter not just captured by a certain cosmology, institutional arrangement,
or even a previous definition of a metaphysical transcendence, but it is
lodged in what Luther calls faith as trust: an anthropological phenomenon
that structures human existence. This is clearly seen in Luther’s commen
tary on the first commandment in the Large Catechism. We know very well
his introductory remarks that set in tandem God, heart, and faith:
“You shall have no other gods.” That is, you should regard me
alone as your God. What does this mean, and how is it to be
understood? What is to have a god? What is God? Answer:
A god is that to which we look for all good and in which we
find refuge in every time of need. To have a god is nothing
else than to trust and believe him with our whole heart. As
I have often said, the trust and faith of the heart alone make
both God and an idol. If your faith and trust are right, then
your God is the true God. On the other hand, if your trust is
false and wrong, then you have not the true God. For these
two belong together, faith and God. That to which your heart
clings and entrusts itself is, I say, really your God.
Yet we often forget the counter-example given by Luther in what im
mediately follows:
This I must explain a little more plainly, so that it may be
understood and remembered, by citing some common exam
ples of failure to observe this commandment. Many a person
thinks he has God and everything he needs when he has mon
ey and property; in them he trusts and of them he boasts so
stubbornly and securely that he cares for no one. Surely such
a man also has a god— mammon by name, that is, money
and possessions—on which he fixes his whole heart. It is the
most common idol on earth. He who has money and property
feels secure, happy, fearless, as if he were sitting in the midst
of paradise. On the other hand, he who has nothing doubts
and despairs as if he never heard of God. Very few there are
who are cheerful, who do not fret and complain, if they do not
have mammon. The desire for wealth clings and cleaves to our
nature all the way to the grave.2'
After expounding on other historical and contemporary examples of
placing hearts and minds on other “gods” than the one and true God,36
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Luther concludes that these forms of idolatry do not “consist merely of
erecting an image and praying to it. It is primarily in the heart, which pur
sues other things and seeks help and consolation from creatures, saints,
or devils.” 22 Two things need to be noted here: In the first place, Luther
employs the category of “heart” as a synecdoche or metonymy for the
subjective dimension of the human being.23At the same time, this is a ma
terially and historically mediated subjectivity that is produced (passively
and actively) through the different relational fields in which persons are
implicated. These relational fields or spheres are what Luther will call
“orders” of creation, orders which always serve as a mediation for trust.24
It is precisely this approach that guides Tillich’s conception of the
dynamics of faith, where faith is defined as the state of being ultimate
ly concerned. An ultimate concern is not only what claims ultimacy for
human life or the life of a group, but also what entails the promise of an
ultimate fulfilment. In this sense, faith is an act of the total personality,
the most centered of all human acts by which humanity is able to tran
scend the flux of relative and transitory experiences of paramount reality
or ordinary life. Therefore, we are driven to faith by an awareness that is
uniquely human— namely, an awareness of a transcendence to which we
perceive to belong and which is not our natural possession. The ultimate
ground for this orientation is not a rational event, but rather the realm
of archetypal drives that are inscribed at the core of humanity’s psyche.
Yet there is never faith without a content toward which it is direct
ed, namely, an “object” that symbolically catalyzes the psychic energies
and concerns of the subject. Furthermore, the dynamic set between the
subject of faith and the object of faith is bound to erase the distance
and estrangement between the two if in the relationship established it
is revealed that both coincide as the same reality: The object of the ulti
mate concern can never be object without being at the same time subject.
This phenomenological observation allows Tillich to distinguish between
true and false ultimacy, and the litmus test for gauging this is the con
sequences upon the subject, her “personality.” In effect, one may place
trust in— i.e., expect fulfillment and ultimacy from— objects and events
such as nation or success, but these are bound to result in an existential
disappointment. The fact that human beings only actualize their being
through symbolic forms implies that every symbolic operation involves
the transposition of one’s being into a form other than one’s own. Thus
every symbolic expression is fraught with the danger of alienation.25 The
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problem is not the sincerity or depth of these faiths, for they also are
centered acts of the whole personality. Rather, the point is where this
centeredness is symbolically located, which leads to the paradoxical loss
of a center thus resulting in the “disruption of the personality.”26
This disruption of personality, however, is more than a simple intra-subjective affair, but truly an inter-subjective matter. Luther may have
been more radical than Tillich on this point, for he saw the existential
reality of humanity in sharp relational terms where self and neighbor were
more thoroughly imbricated than in the classical existential expression of
the twentieth century with its accent upon self-relation.27 False or idola
trous faith, therefore, always entails consequences for the totality of the
fabric of life, not just as a consequence of a misplaced individual ego (as
a sort of contagious or cumulative effect), but because the self is always
mediated by social, political, and economic relationships.
In the second place, Luther sought to place Mammon (cf. Matthew
6 :24 ; Luke 16 : 13) as a signifier of subjectivities that are implicated in

the abuse of these spheres which emerge in the concrete material and
symbolic exchanges that make up human living. In the context of high
Christendom in which Luther was situated, a context that has already
subsumed other historical deities in the process of missionary expansion,
Luther sought to identify a new pattern of exchanges and subjectivity
formation irrupting within the fold of Christendom. Thus what today we
term “capitalism” Luther perceived not only as a new form of economic
and social organization, but also as a new spiritual and material force
in complete dissonance with Christianity: an idolatry. In other words, a
new structuring of hearts and bodies based on the “religious” premise
that something (e.g., money, profit) can be made out of nothing. As we
shall note below, this is what distinguishes Luther’s critique from the
caustic medieval condemnations of usury, for he placed the problem of
money-making squarely within the confession of the first commandment:
Capitalism is trusting in oneself and making oneself God, “for whatever a
man [s/c] trusts in and relies upon is his god.”28 Capitalism, thus, can be
regarded as a religion, albeit a false one. And Luther had a word for this:
the Devil’s work.
Luther’s theological and pastoral approach to early capitalist practices

In order to grasp Luther’s understanding of capitalism, one should
not be confined to his most obvious economic writings— Trade and Usury
( 1524 ) and the Admonition to the Clergy to Preach Against Usury ( 1540 ).38
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References to the economy traverse many of his exegetical, pastoral, and
theological writings as well. Furthermore, one should regard his explicit
allusions against capitalist practices as an extension of his initial con
frontation with the abuse of indulgences and the scholastic pattern of
thought. Thus there are at least two moments—which increasingly over
lapped as the Reformation unfolded—that concentrate Luther’s address
of the problem of capitalism. The first moment, often misunderstood in
the epic reconstruction of the Reformatory movement as merely a cri
tique of church abuses, constitutes a veritable casus confessionis that was
geared not against the Papacy as such, but against the tyranny of a new
logic and practice within the sphere of the church. This moment corre
sponds to Luther’s questioning of penance and indulgences, from the
point of view of a theological postulate where “God does not repay in the
sense of a fair exchange.”29 The biblical testimony indicates to Luther that
God and God’s church embody a different distributive system than the
one presently operating in the ecclesial, political, and economic spheres.
His invectives against indulgences and scholastic thought constitute
the backbone for Luther’s later theological critique of capitalism. After
all, in the medieval church, the most precious of religious goods— for
giveness of sins—had become a commodity through the practices of
indulgences and penance, thereby creating a market in which the church
monopolized the profit resulting from the satisfaction of that need. In
1343 , Pope Clement VI gave a “capitalist” turn to the belief and practice
of indulgences by claiming that the wide distribution of heavenly trea
sure would lead to an increase in merit, which in turn continued the
accumulation of treasure in a sort of virtuous cycle.30Anselm, obviously,
had previously provided a strong Christological backing to this concept
of treasure in Cur deus homo? Furthermore, we should never forget that
the Reformation was preceded by and fueled, inspired, and opposed on
the basis of the profound debt incurred by the house of the Hohenzollers,
who had recently acquired Mainz and. Magdeburg for 50,000 gulden that
needed to be repaid to the lender, the powerful Fugger bankers: Half
of the income from the selling of indulgences went to pay the lender,
and half to Rome (who had the “patent” or “property rights” on indul
gences) . By attacking the church and the practice of indulgences, Luther
addressed, in spite of his original intentions, the central logic of capital
ism that held the church in captivity, not only in practice (indulgences
that transferred the debt to the “buyers”), but also in its theology. In
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effect, the whole confrontation with the works-righteousness scholastic
scheme was an attack on the very premise of a Schuld that can and must
be repaid by the sinner-debtor.
The second moment (from the 1520 s onward) corresponds to Lu
ther’s specific address of the problems created in society by a specific
logic of distribution based on the premise that money and wealth are their
own creative agents, thus obfuscating the fact that money comes from the
exploitation of labor and the creation of debt. He thus addressed the cap
tivity of the economy and the compliance of the state to the mythological
power of money and the creation of debt. His central premise was that
the surplus signified either by interest or by profit comes from the work,
needs, and toil of the debtor/buyer. While quips about material wealth,
usury, interests, avarice, and greed have been a staple in the vitriol of
Franciscans and Dominicans for centuries, Luther does not remain on
the common moralistic ground that simply treats the concept of money
with contempt in order to redirect believers toward higher “religious” val
ues— as seen from Augustine onward. He can and does condemn in the
harshest words usurers and merchants by stating, “Merchants can hardly
be without sin (Ecclesiasticus. 26 :29 ), the love of money is the root of all
evils (I Tim. 6: 10 ),”31 and “Merchants think they are gods.”32 But then he
moves further by unlocking the mystifying qualities of money as resting
in the exploitation of the neighbor’s losses, needs, wants, and labor. “You
cannot make money just with money,”33 Luther notes, underscoring the
perverse machinations of avarice and greed that result in speculation and
profits which undergird a new sphere of exchanges, the capitalist market.
In a revealing passage Luther describes the mechanism of profit and
the “free market” of supply and demand resting on the exploitation of
wants and needs:
When once the rogue’s eye and greedy belly of a merchant
find that people must have his wares, or that the buyer is poor
and needs them, he takes advantage of him and raises the
price. He considers not the value of the goods, or what his
own efforts and risk have deserved, but only the other man’s
[sic] want and need. . . . Because of his avarice, therefore,
the goods must be priced as much higher as the greater need
of the other fellow will allow, so that the neighbor’s need be
comes as it were the measure of the good’s worth and value.40
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And with a note of indignation he asks:
Tell me, isn’t that an un-Christian and inhuman thing to do?
Isn’t that the equivalent to selling a poor man his own need in
the same transaction? When he has to buy his wares at a higher
price because of his need, that is the same as having to buy his
own need; for what is sold to him is not simply the wares as
they are, but the wares plus the fact that he must have them.34
But while want and need may explain the occasion for the profit of
the merchant, it does not describe yet the source for enacting the ex
change between the buyer and the seller. That, for Luther, is labor, the
labor of the buyer, who with his toil provides a surplus of value that the
wares or goods do not inherently possess. The capitalist “sucks up the
other’s blood and sweat.”35 Here lies Luther’s tour de force which comes
to him by carefully analyzing the practice of Rentenkauf or Zinskaup6
and defining it as an extraction of labor through debt: “Thus, when I buy
zinss [the right to collect a return] on a specified piece of land, I buy not
the land but the zinss payer’s toil and effort on that land, by which he is
to bring me my zinss [return].”37
Commenting on Luther’s sermon, the German Marxist historian Ger
hard Brendler points out that “for the first time in the history of economic
thought Luther exposed the fact that the creditor purchased the work of
the borrower and that the interest on the money lent did not come out of
some magic power of money or from the natural fertility of a mortgaged
farm: it came from the work of the borrower.”™Karl Marx himself credits
Luther with this novel insight, calling him “the oldest German political
economist,” and quotes him at length to disprove the idea of “capital as
a spontaneous source of value and its creation,” or “the idea of capital as
a self-reproducing and thereby self-expanding value, lasting and growing
eternally by virtue of its inherent power.”39
Luther’s tirades against the early practices of capitalism point to two
fronts: One is the properly Christian attitude toward it, firmly rooted in
the parenetic dimension of the Gospel that for the Christian, as a bearer
of Christ, comes not as an external demand or law but flows, forth as
a spontaneous practice in the encounter with the neighbor.40 Luther’s
injunctions as to how goods ought to be exchanged by Christians may
sound utterly naive, but they spell out the proper form of exchange— in
principle applicable to all spheres of human existence—as patterned by
the “exchange” between God and humanity enacted in Christ: Here the
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“debtor” (the sinner) is met not by the exacting demands of the “Great
Creditor” (God), but by God’s own self-giving in exchange for human
ity’s losses. It is God’s own Self—namely, Christ—which is given as a
free gift in lieu of the lack that traverses humanity’s very being. In sum,
God’s own economy coincides with God’s own Being, where God does
not demand repayment in the sense of a “fair” exchange between human
virtues and good works for God’s grace and salvation. On the contrary,
the very rules of a ‘fair’ exchange where supply meets demand is abol
ished. This is the “happy exchange,”41 a cornerstone in Luther’s entire
theology, which in turn patterns the exchange of Christians with other
Christians, even with the enemy or stranger.
Luther sincerely believed that confessing Christ implied, in the ma
terial realm of exchanges of God’s gifts, an engagement with one or all
of the four “Christian ways of exchanging external goods with others”42:
to let the other steal our property, to give freely to anyone who needs
it, to lend without expecting anything in return, and to exchange goods
through the buying and selling for hard cash or payment in kind.45 In
other words, Christian communities are spaces of “communist” prac
tices where exchanges and commerce are not ruled by the logic of
capital-making through exploitation of labor, be that through the finan
cial mechanisms of surety, interest-based credit, or selling commodities
“as dear as one can.”44
But then comes the unavoidable question: Does not the world be
come open for the wicked and the idle, for the dispossession of everything
through lying and cheating, cunning and violence?45 It is a fact that those
who are ruled by the Gospel, although robust in faith, are left in a fragile
situation in the spheres of exchange, vulnerable to every type of abuse
and injustice. Were the world to be just ruled according to the Gospel,
Luther repeatedly argues, it would become a desert, peace would vanish,
and trade and society would be destroyed. In other words, although the
Gospel is fragile as a means of ordering society, it is robust in its ability
to transform subjects and create community. The weakness of the Gospel
lies in its means of transformation—love of the neighbor and enemy, as
exposed in the Sermon on the Mount. The Gospel can neither compel
nor enforce its injunctions on those whose subjectivity and practices are
captive to another “god.” Thus Luther’s understanding of the role of law
and secular authority serves as a necessary “anti-fragile” strategy. The
fact that Christians are rare (and will be rare compared to non-believers)
42 | Market and Margins

and that the world is still God’s good creation despite being held captive
by sin led Luther to expound on a theology of the three orders and two
regiments as an antidote to abuse, exploitation, and injustice for the sake
of creation as a whole. We shall return to this in the third section.
Schuld, works righteousness, and gift: the conflict of codes
Revisiting Luther’s thinking in light of Walter Benjamin’s theses, one
can risk the following hypotheses:
1. As Benjamin sustains, the new economic practices described
and criticized by Luther can be theologically (and not just ethically)
approached when those are considered as manifestations of the basic
structure of a religion grounded in Schuld. Luther’s initial confrontation
with Rome had little to do with cosmetic reforms of religious practices
and liturgy but with a cancellation of the classical “sacrificial” economy
of signs where the human subject is always in debt with his “Provid
er,” which resulted in the well-known scheme of works and the selling
of indulgences. This theological economy created a perpetual state of
indebtedness where the more grace was poured, the more of a debtor
one became. This scheme of nature and grace provided the theological
template for the legitimization of new monetary practices— one where
creditor and debtor, God and sinner, engaged in a (capitalist) transac
tional scheme. The Scholastic version of Christianity erected a system of
objects where signs could be exchanged like commodities (i.e., virtues for
grace). Hence Luther’s theological injunctions against capitalist practices
were forged not merely by an ethical indignation, but also by a theological
reversal of a system of exchangeable and negotiable signs by a code based
on Christ as gift— not as Creditor. Hence Luther’s attack upon current
church practices (indulgences), scholasticism (works righteousness),
and capitalism. All are different expressions of the same code.
2 . The cancellation of this economy of signs is theologically enacted

by Luther’s transformation of the code of exchange. Luther introduces an
economy of symbols that is based on the reality of gift. The paramount
expression of this shift is embedded in his theology of the cross where the
frohlich wechsel gives something (Christ) in lieu of nothing (sin, debt).
This implies a total remittance of Schuld, thus breaking a (demonic)
mechanism of asymmetries. The articulation of the Law-Gospel modes
of addressing the human situation expresses this: While the Law teaches
what we ought to do, the Gospel teaches what we ought to receive; while
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the Law is the taskmaster that demands that we work and that we give,
the Gospel grants freely and only commands to receive what is offered.
Thus, “if the Gospel is a gift and offers a gift, it does not demand any
thing.”46
3 . Luther employs this theological template as a critical weapon

against capitalist practices. The lender, speculator, and usurer do not
enact God’s own economy but that of the Devil by producing (material)
indebtedness as a permanent state of being— parallel to the spiritual
indebtedness generated by the church’s theology and practice. In other
words, the Devil (or the demonic) is the mirror image of God (though
a shadowy one) where the terms of the transaction are symmetrically
reversed: While God gives, thus creating the phenomenology of the
receiver, the demon demands, creating the phenomenology of the
exactable—namely, the exploitable. The way in which the spiritual realm
is structured is thus echoed in the secular realm. Hence, for Luther the
problem of capital formation was not just an ethical matter, but a deeply
theological one. In fact, God’s own Being as donum, gift, love, grace, was
at stake.
4 . Capitalist practices are an embodiment of self-seeking gain, in di
rect opposition to Christ’s (and the Christian’s) self-giving presence. It
is an infringement of the first commandment to center one’s whole self
and one’s whole personality not only upon earthly realities, which lack
ultimacy and cannot fulfill the human vocation, but also on the active ex
ploitation of the neighbor’s needs and wants. Thus the heart which clings
to Mammon is grounded in a demonic trust, for it seeks to fulfill its desire
through an idol/demon.
5 . Benjamin’s theses that capitalism draws from Christianity enough
mythical elements in order to constitute its own myth and that capital
ism developed parasitically on Christianity are thus confirmed as long
as Christianity is understood as a system of exchangeable signs along
the lines of Creditor-debtor. Benjamin’s thesis is thus not applicable to a
religion that responds to the problem of Schuld through justification by
grace without works, or through what is the same, the total remittance
of debt.

In sum, capitalism for Luther can be considered as a (demonic) reli
gion in that it replicates in the secular domain the same logic found in the
church dominated by the anti-Christ. It is grounded, indeed, on faith—
but not on faith in Christ. Instead, it is grounded in a trust that “disrupts”4
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personality (Tillich) and eschews the whole fabric of existence. In short,
it is grounded in a mechanism of dispossession.
We need to explore Luther’s distinction of three orders and two reg
iments as a strategy able to deal with evil and abuse. If capitalism can be
regarded as a religion, then another religious formulation is what can
offer an initial critique. Yet this religion must be able to articulate a sphere
that is liberated from the code of exchanges patterned by capital (i.e., the
spiritual) and at the same time claims the spaces ruled by capital (i.e., the
secular). This is what I term Luther’s “anti-fragile” strategy, which refers
not to God’s direct rule (the Gospel) but to God’s governance refracted
by the abiding presence of the sinful, unjust, and demonic. God operates
in these instances mediated by spheres of production and distribution
that can never escape the very randomness and opacity of life, hence the
necessary coercive nature of the institutional mediation of God’s rule. Or,
to put it in more positive terms, God’s rule through law and institutions
exacts (or harnesses) energy from the demonic for the sake of creation.
In the secular domain, the point is not to directly eradicate the demonic
but to constrain its effects.
Before that, however, we need to understand the contours of contem
porary capitalism in order to grasp the mythical associations that money
has acquired by mimicking the dynamics present in any religion: Not only
is capitalism sustained by a trust placed in the endless thirst for profits,
but it also reflects a strategy of keeping the subject away from the core of
his/her subjectivity—a desperate attempt to cover up a gap at the core
of human existence. Contemporary critiques of capitalism will show that
the ultimate problem that we are facing is situated at a “religious” level,
meaning the representation and construction of subjectivity which at
tempts to find the center of the subject outside of itself in the circulation
of commodities in which money acts as the supreme broker and mediator
(i.e., Mammon). This is the symptom of a humanity that is unable to ar
ticulate itself in a meaningful chain of significations.

The Market State: The New Face of Globalized Capitalism
Valuation and financial capital: In endless profits wc trust

The relation between faith and a new configuration of subjective
expectations is what here must hold our attention. This becomes more
significant as we move into the state of our present world-system, which
is purely sustained by a fiduciary alchemy that may be the envy of fading
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religious traditions. Faith and trust are recurring categories employed at
the moment of explaining the bizarre mechanisms that govern our con
temporary world of social relations based on endless profit or gain.47
Profits and endless gains are established—especially in late financial
capitalism— through the differential relationship between signs indicat
ing the “value” of stocks, securities, etc., apparently in relation to how
profitable a company or economic activity is. However, this operation of
valuation is not simply the result of a rational and critical evaluation of the
actual performance of companies and their actual profits, since many of
the companies do not pay dividends on a regular basis, and some of the
most valuable stocks relate to economic activities which do not present
any profit at all. Other factors appear in the capitalist valuation process
which are not linked directly to the present performance of a company,
fund, or asset. The sociologist Manuel Castells suggests that two factors
appear to dominate this valuation process: trust and expectations. If there
is no trust in the institutional environment in which value-making oper
ates, then it cannot be translated into financial value. But if this trust is in
place, then what creates value is the potential future value of a stock. In
other words, it is the expected growth of financial value that is the rule of
thumb for investment in the new economy.48
How are these expectations created? Here is where faith and trust
come in, for it is largely a subjective process made up of a vague vi
sion of the future, some insider knowledge, conscious image-making,
information turbulences generated by geopolitical and economic events,
announcements by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, personal moods
of bank chairpersons or ministers of finance, valuations from respect
ed firms, and herd behavior. But as Castells indicates, this is not to say
that all valuation can be reduced to subjective moods, yet even the most
objective factors are always assessed from a subjective valuation and ex
pectation. He writes:
The performance of companies, supply and demand, mac
ro-economic indicators [the “objective” factors], interact with
various sources of information in an increasingly unpredict
able pattern, where valuations may be ultimately decided by
random combinations of a multiplicity of factors recombining
at increasing levels of complexity, as the speed and volume of
transactions continue to accelerate.4946
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This illustrates that the new stage of financial capitalism “brings the
information technology and the technology of information together in the
creation of value out of our belief in the value we create.”50As mentioned,
value-making is essentially the product of the financial market. Money,
which used to be anchored in the “real economy” as a universal equiva
lent in the exchange of all commodities, has been displaced as a means to
become an end in itself: the only true commodity. This is the triumph, as
Slavoj Zizek notes, of the virtual economy where financial capital func
tions as a purely virtual notion processing real people.51
In effect, in capitalism, exploitation is thoroughly naturalized,
inscribed into the functioning of every social relation. People, goods, com
modities, nature, symbols, and even hopes and expectations are churned
by a voracious information-processing that is almost completely out of
control. If value-making is essentially a product of the financial market,
to reach this market and vie for higher value in it makes of the ends of
economic activity just a means. It is not that value is the result of eco
nomic relations (just or unjust), but now labor, innovation, production,
management, and image-making are a function of the market. As Castells
soberly states, “While the whirlwind of factors entering in the valuation
process are ultimately expressed in financial value (always uncertain),
throughout the process of reaching this critical judgment, managers and
workers (that is, people) end up producing and consuming our material
world—including the images that shape it and make it.”52
Likewise Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri describe the present state
of capitalism as a total event. They point out that
society has become a factory, or rather, capitalist production
has spread such that the labor power of the entire society
tends to be subordinated to capitalist control. Capital increas
ingly exploits the entire range of our productive capacities,
our bodies and our minds, our capacities for communication,
our intelligence and creativity, our affective relations with
each other, and more. Life itself has been put to work.53
This is a new form of totalitarianism in the sense that it is not merely the
tyranny of one sphere upon the other, but the successful production of sub
jectivities according to the economy of desires and the exploitation of fears.
The sacrificial logic reaches its zenith here. As Benjamin asserts, “therein
lies the historical enormity of capitalism,” namely, in that “religion [i.e.,
capitalism] is no longer the reform of being, but rather its obliteration.”54
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The incessant circulation of commodities as signs
But faith or trust in the providential powers of the market and the
expectation of the miracle of money creating more money are not by
themselves enough to explain the complex workings of late financial and
consumer capitalism. Keeping Benjamin’s thesis in mind, capitalism can
be regarded as a religion not on the basis of a metaphysical construct or a
set of rituals, but in that it “essentially serves to satisfy the same worries,
anguish, and disquiet formerly answered by so-called religion.” Yet this
satisfaction operates in a complex web of significations that latch onto
an ontological lack at the core of human existence. In other words, it is
a sign system devised to conceal the fact that humanity is marked by an
ontological incompleteness.
Here we approach the question as to what makes capitalism tick.
Walter Benjamin has already anticipated an answer by pointing out the
negative pole that capitalism seeks to address (e.g., worries, anguish, and
disquiet). We have also seen that these predicaments were codified un
der the master-code of Schuld (guilt/debt), from which a semiotic array
unfolded where the signs of work, law, production, sacrifice, profit, and
wages served to signify the means for the cancellation of this debt. It is
this dimension that escaped the otherwise insightful critique of Marx,
because it is a matter that points to the very ontological incompleteness
of humanity that cannot be grasped through an economicist-materialist
analysis. One must enter a realm where the theological, the ontological,
and the psychological overlap.
In this vein, the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard has advanced a
powerful critique of the Western tendency of thought centered upon the
sign of “production.” He states, “Everywhere man has learned to reflect
on himself, to assume himself, to posit himself according to this scheme
of production, which is assigned to him as the ultimate dimension of value
and meaning.”55 While in traditional (liberal) political economy the hu
man being is conceptualized as a producing animal (or as a tool-making
animal), Marx’s claim wanted to liberate humanity’s productive potential
without ever confronting the anthropological “phantasm” of the human
being continually deciphering herself through her works. Labor was
equated with human essence, an “aberrant sanctification” of work that
shows Marx’s entrapment in theological thought.56 To whatever extent
Marx was able to demystify the liberal abuse of the concept of humanity
as work, he still regarded the working class with the same productivistic48
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code. Both liberal and Marxist conceptions of human nature share a com
mon presupposition: Its fulfillment lies in the unleashing of labor power
through the conquest of nature. Baudrillard writes:
The system of political econoiny does not produce only the
individual as labor power that is sold and exchanged: it pro
duces the very conceptions of labor power as the fundamental
human potential. More deeply than in the fiction of the indi
vidual freely selling his labor power in the market, the system
is rooted in the identification of the individual with his labor
power and with his act of transforming nature according to
human ends. In a work, man [s/c] is not only quantitatively
exploited as a productive force by the system of capitalist po
litical economy, but is also metaphysically overdetermined as
a producer by the code of political economy. . . . And in this
Marxism assists the cunning of capital. It convinces men that
they are alienated by the sale of their labor power, thus cen
soring the much more radical hypothesis that they might be
alienated as labor power, as the “inalienable” power of creat
ing value by their labor.57
The point made by Baudrillard is that classical economy and Marx
operate within a representational discourse, blind to the new form of social
exchanges enacted by capitalism: the political economy of the sign that
separates the signifier (a language term) from the signified (an intended
meaning or image) and its material referent (an object pointed to by the
signifier). The key for him is to understand the semiological structure of
the circulation of commodities where the act of consumption is totally di
vorced from the use-value or utility of the object, inscribed instead by either
prestige or desire. In other words, the center of the contemporary system
is no longer the process of material production, but the political economy
of the play of signs.58 Consumption—and not production for the satisfac
tion of hypothetical needs—has become the chief basis of the social order:
It structures (i.e., encode) behavior and groups through a linguistic sign
function. In sum, consumer objects constitute a system of signs that dif
ferentiate the population by the transference of meaning to the individual
consumer. Literally, the act of consumption is a digestion of signs.
Consumer goods are best understood as “a network of floating sig
nifies that are inexhaustible in their ability to incite desire.”59 Thus a
disturbing reversal is produced, for capitalism has let loose the genie in
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the bottle: No longer is the bourgeoisie seen as exploiting the labor of
the worker, nor does the worker experience estrangement as he or she is
forced to sell his or her labor in the market. A new system has emerged
where the commodity, detached from any social utility, exploits by way
of evoking and seducing the hidden desires of humanity. We live “in the
period of the objects . . . we live by their rhythm, according to their in
cessant cycles.” Thus, “objects are no longer tied to function or to a
defined need. This is precisely because objects respond to something dif
ferent, either to a social logic, or to a logic of desire, where they serve as
a fluid and unconscious field of signification.”60 Humans end up being
consumed by objects, rather than consuming objects themselves.
What is this social logic or logic of desire? How are these related to
Schulcl? It should be apparent by now that the systems of signs structured
around capitalism (i.e., endless profits) and consumerism (i.e., endless
metabolism) are not only imbricated, but also constitute a new language
through which something else speaks. Or rather, through which we are
spoken. Baudrillard writes that
the world of objects and of needs would thus be a world of
general hysteria. Just as the organs and the functions of the
body in hysterical conversion become a gigantic paradigm
which the symptom replaces and refers to, in consumption
objects become a vast paradigm designating another language
through which something else speaks. We could add that the
evanescence and continual mobility reaches a point where it
becomes impossible to determine the specific objectivity of an
illness, for the simple reason that it does not exist. The flight
from one signifier to another is no more than the surface re
ality of a desire, which is insatiable because it is founded on
a lack. And this desire, which can never be satisfied, signifies
itself locally in a succession of objects and needs.61
Desire and consumption are just the “hysterical symptoms” through
which the “demonic” speaks in our contemporary, secularized environ
ment. Schuld is thus externalized by the perpetual circularity and flow
of signs that can never cover the hole that lies at the core of human
subjectivity, the incompleteness of being. Money-making out of thin air,
like consumerism of material or virtual sensations,62 rests on the same
premise: the filling of a void that is not material, but ontological. Schuld
as debt feeds on Schuld as guilt: Both are grounded, to paraphrase Til-50
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lich, in the distortion of being whose subjective moment is the distortion
of personality.
Baudrillard’s analysis helps us on three fronts. Firstly, by unveiling
a psychological and anthropological fragility that has been encoded as a
system of free-floating signs, we notice that there is a lack at the core of
human existence which is exploited ad nauseam by advanced, consumer
capitalism. This lack is the ultimate language which “speaks” through its
hysterical symptoms, pointing to a distortion that abides at the core of the
human psyche—yet is always encoded in a social web of significations.
This approach is similar to Zizek’s concept of the traumatic core at the
heart of the ontological event of being human. The Slovene philosopher
sees the problem of the production and representation of subjectivity as the
core predicament exploited by the capitalist strategy. In line with the theo
logical argument made by both Luther and Tillich, Zizek maintains that the
status of the subject is always processual; that is, it emerges only through
the failure to fully actualize itself. When a subject tries to articulate itself
in a signifying chain, this articulation inevitably fails. But it is precisely in
this failure that the subject as such emerges, which is to say, the subject is
the failure of its signifying representation.65 This is what capital as religion
desperately attempts to conceal, thus fueling the engine of desires and the
mystification of money as a way of actualizing human essence. But as we
saw, it doesn’t actualize anything; it actually consumes.
In both cases the capitalist system of signs acquires a religious aura
since the perpetual unleashing (or production) of desires is allowed to
present itself as salvation through consumption, enjoyment, accumulation
of sensations, and happiness. This is the soteriological dimension of con
sumer capitalism, which, as in the case of the medieval church, evokes and
manipulates demands (i.e., desires) for which it presents itself as the sole
supplier. Thus the glittering and glamorous aesthetics of our late-modern
shoppingscapes, commercials, and images are needed to conceal the fact
that the satisfaction attained by fleeting consumption is no more than a
pseudo-satisfaction that is “superficially exciting but hollow at its core.”64
The system is rigged by this mechanism, whereby the consumption of one
sign (i.e., commodity) automatically elicits a referential relation to other
signs that needs to be had. The bonfire of the vanities is endlessly fanned.
The second front opened by Baudrillard’s post-structural approach
to the economy of signs is that the logic of desire turns out to be based
on the social and psychological need for differentiation, a desire for soGuillermo Hansen | 51

cial meaning over and against other consumers of signs. One cannot live
within an economy of signs without the referential differentiation of signs
from other signs. This has been observed in the Latin American sce
nario by the Argentinian anthropologist Nestor Garcia Canclini in the
way he traces the passage from citizens to consumers.65 While consump
tion is not merely passive but active, the concept of citizenship has been
displaced by the practice of consumption— the primordial referent for
identity. Thus consumption is not an equalizer of social difference, but
rather a deepening of social distinctions.
Last but not least, Baudrillard’s analysis unveils the essential prob
lem inscribed at the core of present financial capitalism: When desire
rather than need ends up driving the market, commodities themselves
become consuming, as do their images— images ultimately designed to
promote further consumption (simulacra). The epitome of this process
is the present network-computerized financial economy, where money
codified as signs in reference to other signs is completely divorced from
the real conditions of production and consumption. This marks the com
plete virtualization of money, a commodity that only exists as a sign;
something that has to be “believed.” And if money makes money in this
virtual machine, then it makes sense to borrow more virtual money to
make more money. Few of the so-called entrepreneurs and job-creators
really own any substantial amount of money; they simply borrow—which
is to say, they are masters of sign-manipulation and speculation, the key
to success in late-financial capitalism.
At this point we can return to both Luther’s and Tillich’s concep
tion of faith as trust and its relation to the formation of subjectivity. For
what stems from our analysis so far is that we are not facing just a set of
objective coordinates obeying rigid historical laws, but the very produc
tion of subjectivities that rest on mythical and psychological mechanisms
whose symptom is capitalism-as-religion. Schuld is at the root of this
phenomenon and fuels an endless circulation, where fleeting signs (i.e.,
commodities) serve as the catalysts for “solving” the human problem: its
utter disjunction, estrangement, lack. Hardt and Negri pose the scenario
as to what type of subjectivity the total market has created. Not only has
neoliberalism shifted the terms of economic and political life, but it has
also “operated a social, anthropological transformation, fabricating new
figures of subjectivity,” and the leading figure produced is that of the
indebted. 66 With this we return to Luther.52
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Luther’s Anti-fragile Strategy:
Three Simultaneous Ways of Christian Living
As indicated in the first section, Luther’s theological injunctions
against capitalist practices were forged not merely by an ethical indig
nation, but by a theological reversal of a system of exchangeable and
negotiable signs structured by the master-code of God-as-Creditor for
one centered in Christ as gift. Hence his attack upon current church
practices (indulgences), scholasticism (works righteousness), and cap
italism (indebtedness): All are different expressions of the same code of
Schuld. For in effect, the drive to maximize gain, the search for self-ag
grandizement, or the quest to earn one’s salvation, are all manifestations
of the same instinct born from the desire to affirm the self in face of
the empirical limits that bind finite existence. For this reason, Luther re
garded the practices of early capitalism (e.g., debt, interest, usury) as
idolatrous and demonic. For him, money and economy, and market and
labor, were theological matters in the sense that these describe fields in
which both the human and God realize their being— God as giver, the
human as receiver. If, for Luther, true faith means that “we are to trust in
God alone and turn to him, expecting from him only good things; for it is
he who gives us body, life, food, drink, nourishment, health, protection,
peace, and all temporal and eternal blessings,” capitalism— codified as
Mammon— is the replacement of God-as-giver by the power and mech
anisms of money, whose blessings are allocated on the basis of “merit.”
The analysis of contemporary critiques of capitalism has shown that
the ultimate problem we are facing is situated at a “religious” level (i.e.,
the representation of subjectivity as one more sign within the circulation of
commodities in which money acts as the supreme arbiter, broker, redeem
er) . Furthermore, the foregoing analysis has also demonstrated that both
the efficacy and the appeal of money is grounded in the old religious axiom
of Schuld—guilt and debt. The problem that we face is therefore twofold:
On the one hand is the predicament of the signification and representation
of subjectivity— namely, how the subject can be dislodged from the virtual
play of referential signs that end up consuming the subject as such by pos
iting that Schuld is a necessary mediation for attaining plenitude of being.
On the other hand, there is a problem as to how the historical, political, and
economic existence that is crisscrossed by the inherently processual fragil
ity of the subject can in fact be contained in its deleterious social effects
without the recourse to totalitarian or oppressive measures.
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The Apocalypse of God, faith, and the self: Living from the end of times
Christianity approaches the first problem, the subject chained to
Schuld, by a radical understanding of faith as an apocalyptic event taking
place in the chain of significations that constitute the subject as such. This
marks an end, yet also a beginning. It is marked by a struggle between
ego and a new self (Christ) as expounded in Paul’s enigmatic words in
Galatians 2 :20 : “Nevertheless, I live; yet not I, but Christ lives in me.”67
Righteousness and faith are not the outcome of hard work on the basis
of our substantial potentialities and attributes, but the acceptance and
integration of an “alien” perspectival stance in the very symbolic web that
constitutes subjectivity.
The understanding of subjectivity as a symbolic and perspectival
event implies that we don’t possess a substantial reality called “ego” or
“consciousness” which produces symbols, but rather, consciousness as
such is the result of symbolic linkages. The ego and consciousness are
thus a virtual world that in Paul’s and Luther’s case comprises a battle
field where an old historical trajectory (represented by Law and sin) dies
and a new life begins (represented by faith and Christ). For Luther, Paul’s
statement, “I live; yet not I, but Christ lives in me,” is the center of his
proclamation of the righteousness of Christ—a righteousness by which
Christ lives in us and which, de facto, introduces a split in our existence,
as well as our consciousness.
It is clear that for Luther the righteousness of Christ denotes not only
a forensic event, but an existential and psychological transition by which
an “alien” life is lived as one’s own. Christ is the symbol for a new social
and relational reinscription of the person, a symbolic order that is unan
chored from a world that pits the person against its own ego, other egos,
and God. Ego is eminently relational, but it is trapped in the wrong set of
perspectives by virtue of a faulty symbolic articulation creating the illusion
that the ego is its own person or substance— namely, that it can attain
the resources for its own realization. Law, works, and ego reinforce each
other, spiraling in recursive circularity around not simply a “lack,” but
an unquenchable desire to conceal and cover up such a gap. This is what
creates the world of Schuld, for, in effect, if the ego is conceived as the
agent whose vocation is to arrive at fulfillment and completion through
means that in principle are not intrinsic, yet instrumentally at its disposal,
then the world of objectivities (other human beings, nature, etc.) can only
appear as means that are sought as erasures of an incompleteness that is
5 4 | M arket and M argins

endemic to the ego. Life becomes, thus, a mechanism not only of accu
mulation, but of dispossession through Schuld. God as the Big-Other/
Creditor, or the human being as a homo oeconomicus whose epitome is
the financist/capitalist, are just two variations of the same trope.
Paul’s expression “not I, but Christ lives in me” implies for Luther
a new environment that literally rearranges the phenomenal self of the
Christian. But in doing so, it unleashes a new identity that is expressed
in the praxis of living. Not only is Christ “fixed and cemented to me and
abides in me” in a purely virtual realm, but it is also the case that Christ
is the name for the transition between virtuality and actuality, since “the
life that I now live, He lives in me. Indeed, Christ Himself is the life that
I now live. In this way, therefore, Christ and I are one.”68 Christ forms
the very life that I now live, a new environment that is disclosed when
one is pulled out of one’s “own skin.” All of Christ’s attributes—grace,
righteousness, life, peace, and salvation— now appear as cemented to
one’s own existence. When one divides one’s own person from Christ’s,
one falls back into the old environment, that of the Law and the power of
the demonic.
The accent upon the new identity of the self in Christ is what ulti
mately embodies the biggest challenge to the understanding of the ego
as the outcome of the consumption of signs. It tackles the issue at its
root, namely, by shifting the code of consumption and debt for that of
the gift. It creates a liberated environment where one is free to love the
neighbor without falling into the mechanisms of Schuld, without seeking
to “consume” the other on the basis of his/her debt and guilt. This free
dom elicited by faith turns the subject outwardly in a twofold manner: as
a giving praxis in the midst of needs and wants, and thus as a “cynical”
critique of the selfish motivations that structure daily living and the pre
vailing ideology informing our culture. Yet this praxis is grounded in a
total passivity, the passivity that results from the new perspectival stance
where God comes to us not as the Big Creditor but as gift. This move
ment is redoubled in the life of the Christian as the death of an old ego,
its semiotic web, and the birth of the new self. This is the strategy that
Luther called “spiritual,” living from the end times as shaped by the event
of Christ as gift (justification by faith). In other words, it outlines a new
political economy of the gift, received and embodied in renewed subjects
gathered in that community we call church.
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Luther’s conception of the three orders: Living between the times
Yet Luther was aware that this transformation of the subject is never
completed in this life, and furthermore, the radical appeal of the Gospel has a limited reach (Christians are rare and few, even in the midst
of Christendom!). The “gospelling”69 of human existence through the
economy of the gift does not provide the efficacious means to govern a
world that is crisscrossed by the forces that promise the ego another type
of fulfilment. This leads to a second strategy, which Luther developed in
his theology of the three orders and two regiments as God’s own indef
inite delay of the final apocalyptic occurrence in history. This strategy
incorporates the former one, yet places it within the historical tension of
living between times, where God shares the stage with the demonic. The
latter cannot be directly eliminated, because it is parasitic on God’s good
creation: Only God’s addressing human beings through law (revealing
a gap, a lack, a hole) can contain, restrict, and curb the demonic ruse.
While the demonic cannot be unswervingly obliterated without endan
gering God’s own creation, it can indirectly be restrained, contained, and
even sapped of its energies through a proper strategy of constraint. And
while the economy is the ultimate abode of the demonic, it is the political
which is able to restrain its venom—or let it loose in the veins of society.
This is the “secular,” anti-fragile strategy developed by Luther, which
corresponds to an existence placed between the times.
Let us proceed to observe how the living between the times or “re
formist” strategy looks in the face of the capitalist predicament outlined
before. It is well known that Luther horizontalized the classical medieval
hierarchical and organic distinction between ecclesia (church), politici
(public realm), and oeconomia (household) by decoupling them from
distinct castes or classes. While maintaining their distinctive features,
Luther ingeniously argued that all human beings participate in these
spheres and their institutions. Vitor Westhelle has demonstrated how the
Aristotelian categories of poiesis and praxis may have informed Luther’s
conception of the range of human activities composed by the spheres of
economy and politics. While poiesis denotes an activity whose outcome
is the production of something, praxis refers to an intersubjective effect
which does not necessarily result in a “material” outcome.
The economy is thus the sphere of a “metabolic” activity of self-pro
duction between human beings and nature, the realm of the forces of
production that seeks to provide the objective means for the sustenance
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and reproduction of life. The political, on the other hand, comprises the
sphere of intersubjective relations of production, which “constitutes it
self as explanatory narrative and public communication”— the medium
of human communicative action, moral deliberation, and juridical legis
lation.70 While poiesis (economy) deals directly with the conditions that
allow for the creation, sustenance, and reproduction of human life, praxis
(politics) deals directly with the virtual/symbolic conditions that regulate
the exchanges among human beings. Both are realms of power, yet they
function differently. The church, however, distinguishes itself from the
other two spheres in that humanity does not produce anything here; no
activity of self-representation is enacted. In this instance, our mode of
being is not that of action, but that of re-action,71 namely, our response
to God’s address which is both virtual (Word) and material (sacraments).
It is important to note, however, that God’s activity in the church does
not happen in a vacuum, but is intertwined with the other two spheres,
vicinities to which the addressees already belong and from which they
cannot extricate themselves.
Another way to interpret Luther’s understanding of the three orders
or mandates is to approach them not just from the productive code (cf.
Baudrillard) but from the distributive one. It refers to a pluralistic view
of distribution, where each sphere obeys different rules. This does not
replace the “productivist” model referred to above, but complements it
by emphasizing that human beings are not just the subjects or objects
of production (active producers and passive consumers); they are also
subjects and objects of the distribution of both virtual and material goods.
Furthermore, what is allocated, shared, or exchanged in the process of
distribution are not just the fruits of physical labor, but also the fruits
of the mind and emotions. As the political philosopher Michael Walzer
notes, “People conceive and create goods, which they then distribute
among themselves.”72 Goods do not appear out of thin air, nor do in
dividuals distribute them according to a homogeneous general principle
such as free exchange, desert, or need. Rather, goods and their particular
social meanings are the central medium of social relations. Before goods
come into physical hands, they are already inscribed in people’s minds.
Thus the distribution of these goods is already conditioned by shared
conceptions of their meaning and their utility. Distributive agents, there
fore, are already constrained by the goods they hold, to the point that one
may say that “goods distribute themselves among people”75 according to
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social rules, desires, wants, needs, and mores that outline specific spheres
of distribution according to explicit criteria.
However, it is one thing to speak theoretically about the (relative)
distributive autonomy within each particular sphere; it is another to ex
perience the way these spheres actually function in society. The reality
is that these spheres are constantly violated. This becomes particular
ly clear when we consider that “most societies are organized on what
we may think of as a social version of the gold standard: one good or
one set of goods is dominant and determinative of value in all spheres
of distribution.”74 When this good or set of goods is monopolized, then
the individuals or groups possessing this particular good acquire a dis
proportionate command of a wider range of other goods. While certain
goods are dominant by their very nature—water in the desert, for in
stance— in most contexts, the reality of dominance and monopoly is the
result of an imbricate social and political creation that compounds reality
and its wants and needs with its symbolic construal. As Walzer notes,
physical and military strength, familial reputation, religious or political
office, landed wealth, and capital and technological knowledge have all
played this role at one point or another in human history. The possession
of a dominant good means it can automatically be converted into another
good, thus cementing the sociological symbiosis between the monopoly
of a dominant social good and the dominance of a ruling class/caste/
group atop all the distributive systems. This is tyranny.
What does this have to do with Luther’s view? For the time being, it
should be apparent that Luther’s understanding of the three “sacred” or
ders through which God comes to us as a gift acknowledges the legitimacy
of different criteria of production and distribution in each one of them,
where producers may dominate in the economic sphere, princes in the
political, and clergy and theologians in the ecclesiastical. They represent
three different ways in which God’s gifts—or God’s “comings”—are re
ceived, used, and abused. It is precisely the reality of abuse (i.e., sin) that
gives a clear institutional format to these three “comings,” erecting pow
erful barriers against (a) the domination of one sphere upon the other,
(b) the abusive domination within each sphere (monopoly), and (c) the
possibility of converting one dominant good into another (tyranny). The
common denominator of these three instances is fragility. Theologically,
we would refer to this as sin, and in mythopoeic language, the work of the
Devil. Luther’s proposal thus addresses the reality and effects of sin in a
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way that allows a society to avoid the temptation of succumbing to mes
sianic and utopian adventures which would almost certainly attempt to
intervene directly—-mostly politically— to erase the traces of life’s fragil
ity. Buttressed by Walzer’s insights, Luther’s theology of the three orders
thus helps us appreciate the gravity of the present situation, a situation
marked by the tyranny of financial capital upon all spheres of life.
Spiritual and secular strategics
The culturally and socially pluralistic environment in which we live
today, compounded by the single rule of capital that undermines every
other sphere, suggests a double strategy that follows Luther’s distinction
between the spiritual and the secular. Since capitalism should be seen as
a (demonic) religion—which is to say, as the construal and production
of subjectivity based on an economy of signs that seeks to center hu
man subjectivity in the endless circulation of goods—we can regard the
Christian church as being engaged in a spiritual-semiotic struggle from
the point of view of a different code. It is a struggle between faith in the
God of Israel and faith in Mammon, between expectations regarding a
promised world and expectations regarding a world of promises, between
belief and unbelief, between clinging to the Master and clinging to Mas
terCard. In short, this is the battle around the fabrication of “figures of
subjectivity” that is always intertwined with the “vicinities” of poiesis and
praxis.75
This is the proper sphere for the church’s struggle as a creature of an
economy based on gift in the midst of a world ruled by the economy of
exchangeable signs. The “demythologization” of capitalism is the present
struggle of the church, for she is always bound to clash with other tech
nologies of the self, particularly with those centered in self-production
through the dispossession of other selves. Thus the simple proclamation
of the Word to our hearts always has an effect on the spheres that our
bodies occupy, the spheres in which it both produces and represents itself
(bodies that are subjectivized by God’s own subjective move). This is the
political and economic mumis (office, service) and usus (use, exercise,
practice) of the Gospel. Thus no church can be said to be preaching the
Gospel today without addressing the problem of the idolatrous faith of
capitalism. This is a spiritual struggle with political and economic effects,
for it redraws the foundation of Schuld and the pattern of exchange. It is
the proclamation of a gift and thus the confession that we don’t believe
in the market; we believe otherwise, in Christ. This is the new “atheistic”
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face of Christianity, which creates a space where we are given permission
to not enjoy, to not be happy, to not have to explore all our “potentialities”
of desire insofar as these are dictated by the capitalist sign-system. This
is freedom.76
At the same time, the struggle and tension is not apart from but with
in the other spheres composing our creaturehood. Here the struggle is
not directly against capitalism per se, but against its tyranny grounded in
the concept of endless profits. Hence, the problem is not whether or not a
market should exist, or the place of money within it; the problem is when
the criterion of distribution within the market (i.e., money in exchange
for goods and services) becomes the criterion that rules in the other
spheres. Thus the main focus is neither the economy nor the church,
but the public sphere, the realm of the commons, governance (politic).
Luther saw in the State the means of restraining the effects of sin and evil
in society (neither oeconornia nor ecclesia have these means of restraint).
Certainly the political sphere and its institutions do not possess the means
to produce “good” people (only the Gospel can do that).77 Neither does
the political sphere possess the means for the production and reproduc
tion of life. But it does have the means to coerce evildoers to do minimally
a superficial good (or, stated negatively, to not do harm).
During the last few decades, we have witnessed an erosion of both
the legitimacy of the State, political parties, and democratically elected
representatives and the active involvement of (democratic) governments
in the very setting up of the rules, institutions, and powers of neoliberal
globalization.78Against the template of Luther’s theology of the two gov
ernances and the three orders, it becomes apparent how important the
role of the State is and how crucial a “re-enchantment” of the political
sphere becomes at this time. Politics, broadly construed, is the only place
that can furnish the mechanisms for controlling the anarchic forces of
the market. In other words, only praxis can create the institutional sphere
where poiesis can regain its role in the sustainment and reproduction of
life. After all, in Luther’s account, politics came into existence when the
economy was affected by sin, as stated in his commentary on Genesis.79
But whose politics? Which State? History shows us that the State— and
the political parties that have taken turns in its administration—easily
becomes a prisoner of economic interests when a democratic culture of
moral deliberation, social control, and rebellion falters. The public space
constituted by this deliberation and mobilization must debate its moral
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values and vision, as well as serve as the foundation for a political resolve
to curb the impulse of a socially and economically powerful minority
through a new regime of democratic representation.
In the meantime, active social policies that deal with the distribu
tion of income, property, and wealth through a reengineering of tributary
criteria and processes are a few of the defining characteristics of the
present (reformist) agenda. It is time that wealth and riches be redistrib
uted among the spheres of health, education, and culture. Furthermore,
these same attitudes and practices need to be applied to our current eco
logical crises. But any reformist strategy must tackle the core issue: the
regulation of the creation and allocation of money that fuels a financial
imperialism. The transference of wealth from the poor, the middle class
es, and the Global South must stop.
One step in this direction would be reform of the banking system.
Practical measures should include the banning of private banks as the
monopolizers in the creation of money out of nothing (i.e., debt), clear
regulation that differentiates investment banks from savings banks, the
promotion of person-to-person banking as well as cooperatives and credit
unions, creation of a new international currency that can provide stability
to world commerce, etc. Nevertheless, these practical measures will be
ineffectual if they are not accompanied by a strong political will that de
mocratizes the creation and allocation of money, thereby suppressing the
“invisible hand” of the market as the final arbiter of wealth and well-be
ing. But it must further be kept in mind that the new relation between
capitalism and territoriality signified by a globalized economy must also
inform our people’s vision and strategies for justice. As mentioned be
fore, because we participate in a global economic network, we are also
subjected to social processes that transcend our own groups, classes, and
nations. What this means in the long run is that a “globalization from
below” (Gorostiaga)— the international networking of groups and as
sociations—rconstitutes one of the means for the birth of a democratic
“geoculture” that would be able to cast a new vision for life in this planet.
Bifurcations: Living at the end of (a) time
The above is just the description of an anti-fragile strategy that I see
implied by Luther’s understanding of the three orders as an indefinite de
lay of the final apocalyptic occurrence. By its very nature, it is a reformist
strategy—but not necessarily a revolutionary one. It is a strategy to live
“between the times,” in the midst of a tension. Yet living between the
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times also means that the end of an historical cycle is eventually reached.
Thus the challenge is how to be engaged as Christians in a reformist
path even while “eagerly expecting” (apekdechomai, cf. Galatians 5 :5 ; 1
Corinthians 1:7 ; Romans 8 : 19)80 a revolutionary overhaul which, while
not attempting to second-guess God’s own time, can nonetheless em
brace a kairos that is inscribed in the very apocalyptic being of God and
Christians. I would like to see this as a third, apocalyptic strategy where
Christians, who by definition are a people marked by the praxis of the
Holy Spirit, are ready to embrace an unforeseen event in history in part
nership with their neighbors. Within this strategy—which condenses the
other two—acts of engaging in socio-political reforms are carried out
in preparation for and in anticipation of an event that can be neither
foreseen nor predicted in all its details. The practices of equality, fair
taxation, redistribution of income, freedom, sustainability, open access
to the commons, etc. form the scaffolding on which, in the event of a
radical break in history, a new “ordering” of global society can develop.81
The centering of subjectivities in the apocalypse of God (Christ) propels
a reformist tactic in the here and now while being open to—even eagerly
expectant of— a revolutionary event in the near future.
Chaos theory may teach us here a very important “apocalyptic” les
son: Like any living system, human societies are open systems at one
point or another faced with a bifurcation. By all indications we are in
fact approaching such a moment. The chronic crises that we are facing
(debt, unemployment, health coverage, rising costs of education, etc.)
suggest that the main structural problems cannot be resolved within the
parameters offered by the system itself. It is only by going outside of and
beyond the historical system that these crises can be (even temporarily)
resolved. At the brink of bifurcation, it is chaos that dominates, meaning
that “every small action during this period is likely to have significant
consequences.”82 It is a time where little ripples can become unstoppa
ble waves, where small gestures may have towering repercussions. Thus
our engagement in “reformist” practices—just a collection of temporary
measures— is not only important for creating breathing space for those
who are suffocated by the market’s onslaught, but it is even more critical
for providing a template and vectors for the future in a period when the
system as such may be about to collapse. These practices are like writing
a manual for how to create and live in a new society. Thus we may say we
are reformists— not for the sake of keeping the system, but for the sake of
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new trajectories at the brink of an impending change still open regarding
its outcomes. One thing must be clear: The capitalist world-system is
reaching its nadir. What will come next is anybody’s guess, but we have
a chance for engaging in action and thought that announce a coming
system “where everybody has a place.”83
Finally, the church of Jesus Christ is the “laboratory” of the Spirit—
which is to say, it is the location where new perspectival stances and new
subjectivities are forged, ready to embrace new trajectories. And here,
more than ever, the reversal initiated by Luther— namely, the replace
ment of an economy of exchangeable signs by an economy of gift— is at
the core of what the proclamation and embodiment of the Gospel does:
the justification of the indebted by grace alone.84 Thus every assembly
addressed by the Word, every Lord’s Prayer, every exorcism in baptism,
and every sharing of the blessed sacrament is an anti-capitalist practice—
despite the particular ideological makeup of those gathered, its leaders,
or the denominational-institutional bylaws. To paraphrase the Augsburg
Confession, section VII, the pure preaching of the Gospel and the cor
rect administration of the sacraments acquire their proper outline against
the background of a false gospel and a spurious administration of God’s
gifts. This is the mind of Christ taking place in ours, establishing its own
oeconornia through the conformation of a new body (cf. 1 Corinthians
12). Indeed, the Word effects what it says.85
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